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INDEMNITY AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES: AN
EXAMINATION OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES, THEIR
PURPOSE, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE COVERAGE
PROVISIONS OF THE TEXAS STANDARD
AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE POLICY
by
Roy R. Anderson, Jr.*
N considering the question of whether exemplary damages assessed
against an insured are covered by his liability insurance policy, it should be
kept in mind that the concept of exemplary damages is as utilitarian a doc-
trine as exists in law. Depending upon the particular jurisdiction, court, and
jury, exemplary damages serve to punish roguish defendants, to make ex-
amples of such defendants before society, to protect society's interest in
right conduct and fair play, to compensate aggrieved plaintiffs for actual
injuries too speculative to be proved with sufficient certainty, to vent the
outrage of juries, to help insure payment of attorney fees of plaintiff counsel,
and on and on.' Parading under aliases such as "vindictive damages," "puni-
tive damages," and "smart money," the doctrine is truly chameleon-like,
changing color with the jurisdiction, and hue with the circumstances of the
particular case.
Although the social origins of exemplary damages have been traced to
biblical times2 and its legal origins in common law can be traced back some
two hundred years, 3 the concept has not developed in an orderly manner
and we are left today with few fundamentals upon which to develop a thread
of reasoning when analyzing the application of the doctrine to a particular
legal problem. Lord Camden in Huckle v. Money is said to have been
first to use the term "exemplary damages."' 4 In that case defendant falsely
imprisoned plaintiff under an illegal warrant for a period of only six hours.
A verdict of 300 pounds was upheld because the liberty of the plaintiff was
at issue, even though the period of detention was short and he was quite
well treated and plied "with beef steaks and beer."
The concept of exemplary damages is an outgrowth of the old common
law practice of allowing juries unlimited discretion in setting the amount of
* B.A., Texas Christian University; J.D., Southern Methodist University. Associate
Dean and Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1 See generally Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1173(1931).
2 "When a man steals an ox or a sheep, and slaughters or sells it, he shall restore
five oxen for the one ox and four sheep for the one sheep." Exodus 21:37.
3 Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); accord, Chambers v.
Robinson, 2 Str. 691, 93 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B. 1726).
4 2 Wils, 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); see 1 T. SEDOWICK, DAMAGES § 348
(9th ed. 1920), and Justice Stone's opinion in Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co. v. Yeldell,
274 U.S. 112, 116 (1927).
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damages. 5 It was not until the early eighteenth century that courts began
setting aside excessive verdicts in tort actions.6 With Huckle v. Money in
the 1760's, courts began to talk in terms of "exemplary damages" and to
affirm excessive verdicts on the basis of their compensating injured plain-
tiffs for intangible injuries such as mental suffering, wounded pride, and the
like. The courts began saying that, in appropriate cases, large verdicts
functioned to punish defendants as well as to compensate plaintiffs. 7 This
confusing blend of purposes, punishment on the one hand and compensa-
tion on the other, was picked up by American courts and was rampant in this
country well into the nineteenth century.8 As compensation for intangible
injuries came to be regarded as actual damages, the emphasis on exemplary
damages began to shift from compensation to punishment. Unfortunately,
remnants of this confusion of purpose of exemplary damages still exist in this
country today, and as will be discussed later, necessarily complicate inquiries
into whether liability insurance policies should cover exemplary damages
assessed against the insured wrongdoer.
From the outset, the concept of punitive damages has been controversial
and the butt of heated criticism. 9 The concept has been chided for failing
to fulfill its function of a deterrent and condemned for providing windfalls
to lucky defendants. Indiscriminate windfalls, it has been suggested, violate
the most basic of principles of damage law, the principle of compensation,
that a plaintiff should be made whole but no more. 10 A strong case has
been made that, because the primary purpose of punitive damage awards is
punishment, these awards are by nature criminal, and defendants subjected
to them should be accorded the procedural due process safeguards of
criminal proceedings-for example, the privilege against self-incrimination."
It has also been argued that exemplary damages should fall under the doc-
trine of double jeopardy, and a defendant should not be subjected to both
criminal prosecution and civil penalty. 12
To the critics of exemplary damages, Professor Dobbs in his treatise on
remedies points to a fundamental function of exemplary damages in the
modern legal scheme. Under what he labels the "bounty" or "private at-
5 See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REV. 517, 518-19
(1957).
6 Early cases include: Chambers v. Robinson, 2 Str. 691, 93 Eng. Rep. 787 (K.B.
1726); Ash v. Lady Ash, Comb. 357, 90 Eng. Rep. 526 (K.B. 1696); Wood v.
Gunston, Style 466, 82 Eng. Rep. 867 (K.B. 1655).
7 Huckle v. Money, 2 Wils. 205, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763); Wilkes v. Wood.
Lofft 1, 18-19, 98 Eng. Rep. 489, 498-99 (C.P. 1763).
s See generally Note, supra note 5, at 520.
0 See Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 382, 16 Am. R. 270, 320 (1873) labeling ex-
emplary damages "a monstrous heresy . .. an unhealthy excrescence, deforming the
symmetry of the body of the law." See also Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 P. 119
(1884); Pegram v. Stortz, 31 W. Va. 220, 6 S.E. 485 (1888); Willis, Measure of
Damages When Property Is Wrongfully Taken by a Private Individual, 22 HARV. L.
REV. 419, 420-23 (1909).
10 See Morris, Rough Justice and Some Utopian Ideas, 24 ILL. L. REV. 730 (1930);
70 YALE L.J. 1296 (1961).
11 D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES § 3.9, at 220 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as DOBBS], citing Ford, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, in DEFENSE
RESEARCH INSTITUTE, THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 15 (1969).
12 Aldridge, The Indiana Doctrine of Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy,
20 IND. L.J. 123 (1945); Willis, supra note 9, at 420-21.
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torney general" theory,'" Professor Dobbs submits that punitive damages
may often provide the needed incentive for a plaintiff to bring action against
a defendant for outrageous behavior. 14 His theory is that punitive dam-
ages are thereby beneficial to society, especially in cases involving wrongs
against society generally, in situations where civil action would be other-
wise economically unattractive or in situations where the plaintiff is reluctant
to initiate criminal proceedings and the state is diverted by the burden of
more important criminal matters.
The Court of Appeals of New York in Walker v. Sheldon'5 recognized
the importance of this function of exemplary damages. In Walker the court
disregarded the longstanding rule in New York of not allowing punitive dam-
ages in actions for fraud and deceit because the public interest was at
stake. The court said:
Punitive or exemplary damages have been allowed in cases where
the wrong complained of is morally culpable, or is actuated by evil
and reprehensible motives, not only to punish the defendant but to
deter him, as well as others who might otherwise be so prompted,
from indulging in similar conduct in the future . .. Moreover, the
possibility of an award of such damages may not infrequently induce
the victim, otherwise unwilling to proceed because of the attendant
trouble and expense, to take action against the wrongdoer. 16
Even though controversy has always surrounded the doctrine, exemplary
damages continue to be recognized, and generally awarded in appropriate
cases, in the vast majority of jurisdictions in this country. Only three states,
Massachusetts,'17 Nebraska,' 8 and Washington' 9 refuse to recognize the doc-
trine in any case not authorized by statute.20  Three other states, Con-
13 Donas § 3.9, at 205, 221.
14 See also C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 77, at 276-77
(1935) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]:
Perhaps the principal advantage is that it [the doctrine of exemplary
damages] does tend to bring to punishment a type of cases of oppressive
conduct, such as slanders, assaults, minor oppressions, and cruelties,
which are theoretically criminally punishable, but which in actual practice
go unnoticed by prosecutors occupied with more serious crimes. . . . The
self-interest of the plaintiff leads to the actual prosecution of the claim for
punitive damages, where the same motive would often lead him to refrain
from the trouble incident to appearing against the wrongdoer in criminal
proceedings.
15 10 N.Y.2d 401, 179 N.E.2d 497, 223 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Ct. App. 1961).
16 179 N.E.2d at 498, 223 N.Y.S.2d at 490.
17 See City of Lowell v. Massachusetts Bonding & Ins. Co., 313 Mass. 257, 47
N.E.2d 265 (1943); Boott Mills v. Boston & M.R.R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680
(1914).
18 See Wilfong v. Omaha & Council Bluffs St. Ry., 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537
(1935); Riewe v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881).
19 See Conrad v. Lakewood Gen. Hosp., 67 Wash. 2d 934, 410 P.2d 785 (1966);
Anderson v. Dalton, 40 Wash. 2d 894, 246 P.2d 853 (1952); Wilson v. Sun Publishing
Co., 85 Wash. 503, 148 P. 774 (1915).
20Most authorities list Louisiana among those jurisdictions refusing to allow
exemplary damages. See MCCORMICK § 78, at 279. And indeed Louisiana decisions
often repudiate the doctrine of exemplary damages absent statutory authorization.
Vincent v. Morgan's Louisiana & Tex. R.R. & Steamship Co., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541(1917); Post v. Rodrigue, 205 So. 2d 67 (La. App. 1967). But in actions involving
wrongs fraught with malice and wanton conduct, Louisiana courts allow a reasonable
facsimile of exemplary damages under the theory of compensation. Loeblich v.
1973]
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necticut, 21 Michigan, 22 and New Hampshire23 recognize exemplary dam-
ages but regard their function as primarily compensatory. Notwithstanding
the nagging hangover of the peculiar early common-law functional dichot-
omy of punishment and compensation, 24 all other states recognizing the doc-
trine regard exemplary damages as primarily punitive and as a windfall to
the plaintiff.2 5
The Restatement of Torts defines punitive damages in terms which would
be acceptable in most states in this country. 26 The Restatement distinguishes
punitive damages from nominal and compensatory damages on the basis of
purpose and on the basis of method of computation. 27 Generally speaking,
punitive damages are amounts awarded as damages for the purposes of
punishing a defendant for outrageous conduct and deterring a defendant
and others from similar future transgressions. 28  The conduct of the de-
fendant which will give rise to exemplary damages must be either: (1) in-
tentional and capable of being regarded as "wilful and malicious and wan-
ton,"29 or (2) grossly negligent coupled with a culpable state of mind ex-
hibiting a "wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others.13 0  Ex-
emplary damages are assessed, not because of the degree of harm caused,
but because of the nature of the defendant's wrong. Accordingly, a cul-
pable state of mind on the part of the tortfeasor is necessary in order for
exemplary damages to be appropriate in a given case.3 ' On occasion, cases
speak in terms of gross negligence in itself being sufficient to give rise to
punitive damages, thereby raising the inference that a culpable state of
mind is not essential.32 But a close reading of such cases makes clear that
Gamier, 113 So. 2d 95 (La. App. 1959). As Professor Dobbs notes: "Presumably a
thorn by any other name will hurt as much." DOBBS § 3.9, at 204 n.3.
21 In Connecticut exemplary damages are limited in amount to the expenses of
litigation. MCCORMICK § 78, at 279. See Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn.
533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941), noted in 132 A.L.R. 1259 (1941); Doroszka v. Lavine, 111
Conn. 575, 150 A. 692 (1930), noted in 69 A.L.R. 1279 (1930); Craney v. Donovan,
92 Conn. 236, 102 A. 640 (1917).
22 McFadden v. Tate, 350 Mich. 84, 85 N.W.2d 181 (1957); Hasted v. Van Wagnen,
243 Mich. 350, 220 N.W. 762 (1928); Wise v. Daniel, 221 Mich. 229, 190 N.W. 746
(1922).
23 Bixby v. Dunlap, 56 N.H. 456, 22 Am. R. 457 (1876); Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342, 16 Am. R. 270 (1873).
24 See text accompanying note 8 supra.
25 See Gonsoulin, Is an Award of Punitive Damages Covered Under An Automobile
or Comprehensive Liability Policy?, 22 Sw. L.J. 433 (1968).
26 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 908 (1939).
27 Id. § 903, comment (a).
28 Id. § 908, comment (a); cf. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d
432, 445 (5th Cir. 1962), stating that the rationale of compensatory damages is not so
much a policy that the responsible party should pay, but more a policy that the wholly
innocent party should not pay. With respect to punitive damages, however, the rationale
is very much that the responsible party should pay.
29 Gostkowski v. Roman Catholic Church of the Sacred Hearts of Jesus & Mary,
262 N.Y. 320, 186 N.E. 798, 799 (Ct. App. 1933).3 0 Miller v. Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293, 294 (1948).
31 This concept should not be confused with the converse proposition of a minority
of jurisdictions that exemplary damages will not lie unless substantial actual damages
have been proven. See, e.g., B & B Refrigeration & Air Conditioning Service Co. v.
Stander, 263 Md. 577, 284 A.2d 244 (Ct. App. 1971); Mabry v. Abbott, 471 S.W.2d
442 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971), error ref. n.r.e.; Annot., 17 A.L.R.2d 527 (1951).
32 See, e.g., Smith v. Clemmons, 216 Ala. 52, 112 So. 442 (1927); Bailey v. Smith,
132 S.C. 212, 128 S.E. 423 (1925).
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the negligence involved must be so gross as to indicate a conscious disregard
for the rights and safety of others or extreme anti-social behavior.83 There
are only two narrow areas of exception to this rule which are unimportant
to the present discussion.3 4
The issue of liability insurance coverage of exemplary damages assessed
against an insured tortfeasor is necessarily confined to those cases involving
gross negligence coupled with a culpable state of mind. Cases involving in-
tentional misconduct do not present the problem because today liability in-
surance policies universally exclude intentional wrongdoing from coverage.
In any event, the specific exclusion of intentional wrongdoing is relatively
unimportant, because the courts in this country have long held insurance
against willful misconduct to be violative of public policy.35 Illustrative of
this fact is the following statement by Justice Cardozo in Messersmith v.
American Fidelity Co.: "Undoubtedly the policy is to be confined to lia-
bility for injuries that may be described as accidental. Even if its terms
did not so limit it, the fundamental principle that no one shall be permitted
to take advantage of his own wrong would import the limitation."3 6  As
fundamental as Justice Cardozo's observation may appear to be, there is
authority to the contrary. An interesting case in point is the Sixth Circuit
decision in New Amsterdam Casualty Co. v. Jones,3 7 arising in Michigan.
Jones, a gas station owner intentionally shot Martin under the erroneous belief
that Martin was a gangster bent upon causing him harm. Jones served a
criminal sentence for willful and felonious assault for his trouble. Jones'
insurance policy covered accidental injury but did not specifically exclude
intentional injuries. In the civil action by Jones against his insurance com-
pany, the court held that the distinction between intentional and accidental
injuries is to be made from the viewpoint of the injured party. Accordingly,
the injury in question was considered by the court to be accidental.38 The
court went on to reject the contention of the insurance company that insur-
ance against intentional wrongdoing would violate public policy:
The public policy governing such contracts is that one should not
profit from his own wrongful act, and that contracts to commit illegal
acts or agreements which have a tendency to encourage unlawful con-
duct, are not to be sustained.
33 Cf. Rutland v. Dean, 60 Ga. App. 896, 5 S.E.2d 601 (Ct. App. 1939); Goff v.
Lubbock Bldg. Prods., 267 S.W.2d 201 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1953), error ref.
n.r.e.
34 The exceptions are cases involving abuse of power or privilege, such as wrongful
firing of employees or wrongful stopping of services by utility companies, and cases in
which the tortfeasor's conduct is so reckless that courts impute a culpable intent per
se, even though the tortfeasor actually believed his conduct to be correct at the time.
See generally DOBBS § 3.9, at 206-07.
35 But see Hill v. Standard Mut. Cas. Co., 110 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1940), upholding
policy exclusion from coverage of the wanton acts of the insured in action involving
the Indiana guest statute requiring plaintiff to prove wanton negligence for recovery.
36 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432, 433 (1921). See also Richardson v. The Fair,
Inc., 124 S.W.2d 885 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939), error dismissed, judgment
correct.
37 135 F.2d 191 (6th Cir. 1943).
38 Under this reasoning, it is unlikely that the court would have reached a different
result even if the policy had specifically excluded intentional injuries.
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In this regard, it is to be remembered that the insured is not seeking
indemnity for the consequences of his own wrongful conduct; and that
the provisions of the contract did not specifically insure against liability
for unlawful acts. If the insured were bringing the action, a com-
plete defense could be predicted and sustained on grounds of public
policy that he could not profit by securing indemnity for his inten-
tional wrongdoing; and if the policy had specifically insured against
liability for intentionally injuring another, the contract would doubtlessly
be void for its tendency to encourage illegal conduct.
Public policy is a changing concept and, in the case of a particular
state, must be viewed in the light of the legislative acts and judicial
pronouncements of that state; and courts are careful not to set aside
contracts on grounds of public policy except in a clear case.39
The court also reasoned that, since there was evidently no premeditation
on the part of Jones, the insurance policy could not be said to have encouraged
illegal conduct.
The court's hindsight on the premeditation point is indeed questionable.
Further, one can only speculate as to why the court chose to disregard the
obvious proposition that, regardless of who was party to the instant action,
if the insurance company was obliged to pay for Jones' transgres-
sions, Jones would no longer 'be legally obligated to do so. Fortunately,
decisions along this line are few, and the strong rule of law in this country
is that one may not insure himself against the consequences of his own in-
tentional acts.
But this is not always to say that one cannot insure against the conse-
quences of one's illegal acts. As Justice Cardozo noted in Messer-
smith,40 the automobile safety and state highway laws have so covered the
field that it is virtually impossible for liability to be incurred in an auto-
mobile accident without fault that is also a crime. State legislatures uni-
versally authorize indemnity by insurance companies for damages arising
through the ownership, operation, and maintenance of automobiles, and
"[t]o restrict insurance to cases where liability is incurred without fault of the
insured would reduce indemnity to a shadow."'41
As generally as the courts in this country have repudiated indemnity
against intentional misconduct, they have allowed indemnity against simple
negligence. 42 And the courts have consistently held that indemnity against
gross negligence is consistent with public policy as long as such negligence
falls short of intentional wrongdoing.43  As the Fourth Circuit noted in
Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Thornton: "Negligent conduct may be so gross as to merit characterization
as willful and wanton in the sense of the rule for punitive damages, yet
39 135 F.2d at 193-94.
40 232 N.Y. 161, 133 N.E. 432 (1921).
41 133 N.E. at 432; cf. Jones v. Ross, 141 Tex. 415, 173 S.W.2d 1022 (1943).
42 See generally Brin, Punitive Damages and Liability Insurance, 31 INS. COUNSEL J.
265 (1964); Morris, Punitive Damages in Personal Injury Cases, 21 OHIO ST. L.J. 216
(1960).
43 See, e.g., Pennsylvania Threshermen & Farmers' Mut. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Thornton,
244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957); General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d
452 (6th Cir. 1956).
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fall far short of an assault and battery which would distinguish it from an
accidental event and withdraw it from the coverage of the policy."'44 With
respect to automobile guest statutes requiring gross negligence or wanton and
malicious conduct in order for liability to attach, the courts have held with
regularity that such coverage is not violative of public policy.4" In Travelers
Insurance Co. v. Reed Co. a Texas court reasoned as follows:
We have the same action both for ordinary negligence-the failure
to exercise ordinary care-and gross negligence; and to the extent of
compensation, both actions are governed by the same rules of law. A
count on gross negligence includes all lesser degrees of negligence ...
The only difference between the two actions is that in the action for
gross negligence the injured party may recover punitive damages. Since
on the issue of compensation the same rules of law govern both ac-
tions, and both actions are for 'negligence,' we think a policy of insur-
ance, indemnifying the insured against loss resulting from negligence,
should be construed to cover both ordinary and gross negligence."6
Considering the one-time controversies over indemnity for simple negli-
gence, gross negligence, and intentional misconduct, it is indeed surprising,
if not ironic, that the very basic question of indemnity for exemplary dam-
ages escaped consideration for so long.47 Even today less than one-third
of the jurisdictions in this country have considered the question and there
is a definite split in authority as to its answer. Simply stated, resolution of
the issue requires a twofold analysis: (1) Is indemnity for exemplary dam-
ages provided for by the express wording of the coverage provisions of the
insurance policy at issue? (2) If such coverage is provided for, does in-
demnity against exemplary damages violate public policy? For even though
freedom of contract is as sacred a doctrine as is known to law, the parties
thereto may not organize their individual relationships in contravention of
basic tenets of public policy. Before detailed inquiry into each prong of the
overall question, it will be helpful to turn to the brief and sketchy history
of judicial decisions on the question in this country. Because the treatment
44 244 F.2d 823, 827 (4th Cir. 1957).
45 See, e.g., Barringer v. Employer's Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 62 So. 2d 173 (La.
1952); Rothman v. Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co., 134 Ohio St. 241, 16 N.E.2d 417
(1938); Travelers Ins. Co. v. Reed Co., 135 S.W.2d 611 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1939), error dismissed, judgment correct; United Serv. Auto. Ass'n v. Zeller, 135
S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1939), error dismissed, judgment correct.
See also General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956);
Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
46 135 S.W.2d 611, 617 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1939).
47 Some writers suggest that insurance companies have assumed that they were liable
for punitive damages assessed against their insured and have anticipated this expense in
establishing premium rates. E.g., 63 COLUM. L. REV. 944, 950 (1963). As an ex-
planation of the reason the issue has so successfully avoided litigation, however, the
converse proposition is equally plausible. Probably the greatest factor which might
explain this dilemma is the fact that the typical insurance company liberally engages
in out-of-court settlements where actual damage is the result of gross misconduct on the
part of its insured. Other factors to be considered are the sometimes relative monetary
insignificance of punitive awards, the fact that punitive damages coupled with com-
pensatory damages often amount to a sum well within policy limits, the failure of
courts and juries to break down awards ascribing specific sums as compensatory and
punitive damages, and the increased readiness of courts to reduce and remit large
verdicts where the jury's concept of compensation is to the court's mind excessive.
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of exemplary damages varies significantly among jurisdictions, the case law
will be considered by jurisdiction with as much attention to chronology as
feasible.
I. CASE HISTORY
Although as late as 1966 two distinguished writers were stating that a
majority of the courts in this country held to the view that exemplary dam-
ages were recoverable under an automobile liability insurance policy, 48
presently the strong majority rule is to the contrary. Nine states49 have
ruled that exemplary damages are not covered by liability insurance, while
six states50 have ruled in favor of such coverage. 51
A. Cases Not Allowing Coverage
Colorado. The first case to rule on the point was the Colorado Supreme
Court decision in Universal Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Tenery.52 In Ten-
ery Callahan rented an automobile from the Hertz Drive-Ur-Self System, Inc.,
and signed a rental agreement for the automobile. Later in the evening he
carelessly and negligently operated the automobile so as to cause a collision
with an automobile driven by Tenery. The collision resulted in property
damage and personal injury to Tenery. In an action against Callahan,
Tenery recovered compensatory and exemplary damages. Subsequently,
Tenery brought a garnishment action against Universal Indemnity Insurance
Company, which had issued the liability policy for Hertz. Universal Indem-
nity contended that it was not liable for exemplary damages, but did not
assign this point as error on appeal. Stating that consideration of this
point was necessary to do justice in the case, the Colorado Supreme Court
nevertheless considered the question, and modified the judgment to exclude
the exemplary damage claim. The court based its holding on the construc-
tion of the policy language, and, although the court did not discuss the ques-
tion of public policy, the following language would indicate that public policy
was also at the basis of the court's decision:
Included in the total amount of the judgment entered against the gar-
nishee herein was the award of exemplary damages against defendant
Callahan in the sum of $1,000. This award was primarily for the pun-
ishment of Callahan for his wrongful acts and as a warning to oth-
ers. It was in no wise compensation to the injured party for bodily
injuries or actual loss occasioned by the negligence by Callahan. The
insurance company did not participate in this wrong, and was under
no contract to indemnify against such. In this particular matter the
48 See 7 J. APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 4312 (1962); 15 G. COUCH,
CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 56:27 (2d ed. 1966). See also 7 AM. JUR. 2D
Automobile Insurance § 196 (1963).4 9 Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Pennsylvania.50 Alabama, Arkansas, Kentucky, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas.
51 Arguably New Jersey, for reasons noted herein, and Alabama and Kentucky, be-
cause of peculiar state statutes, should be dropped from the tally. The score would
thereby be adjusted to eight for the majority and four for the minority.
52 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
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policy indemnifies against damage for bodily injuries, and nothing in
addition is contracted for, and there is no further liability. The in-
jured will not be allowed to collect from a non-participating party for
a wrong against the public.53
In 1971 two intermediate Colorado courts again considered the question
and reaffirmed the decision in Tenery. In Brown v. Western Casualty &
Surety Co.54 the sole question before the court was whether the insurance
company was' liable for exemplary damages assessed against an insured
under its liability policy. 55 Quoting the language from the decision in Ten-
ery, the court ruled that exemplary damages are clearly not assessed "be-
cause of bodily injury," and accordingly, exemplary damages were not cov-
ered by the provision of the policy.
In Gleason v. Fryer56 the Colorado Court of Appeals held that the trial
court erred in permitting the plaintiff to recover exemplary damages from
the garnishee insurance company and modified the judgment in this regard.
Citing Tenery, the court stated that exemplary damages are intended pri-
marily as punishment for wrongful acts and as an example to others. Ac-
cordingly, exemplary damages were not compensation for injuries suffered
and were, therefore, not covered by the language of the liability policy.
Missouri. Following Tenery, the next case on point is Ohio Casualty Insur-
ance Co. v. Welfare Finance Co.,57 arising in Missouri and decided by the
Eighth Circuit. The exact question before the court was whether a policy
of liability insurance covered punitive damages assessed against the insured
corporation for the negligent conduct of its employee. The insurance
company argued that since the policy insured only against " 'accidentally
sustained' injuries," the policy included only compensatory damages, but
that, if the policy should be held to cover punitive damages, such coverage
would be void as against public policy. The policy in question insured the
corporation "against loss by reason of liability imposed by law upon the
assured for damages on account of bodily injuries . . . accidentally sustained
...by any person or persons, other than employes of the assured." s58  The
court held that the policy language covered exemplary damages saying:
"Since this policy clearly covers bodily damage through negligence and since
these punitive damages are imposed because of the aggravated circum-
stances or form of this negligence, such punitive damages must be regarded
as coming within the meaning of -the policy."5 9 With respect to the public
policy argument, the court said:
53 39 P.2d at 779.
54484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971).
55 Pertinent language of the policy was as follows: "To pay on behalf of the in-
sured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at any time resulting
therefrom, sustained by any person and caused by accident." Id. at 1253.
56 30 Colo. 106, 491 P.2d 85 (Ct. App. 1971).
57 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935).
581d. at 58.
59 id. at 59. Citing several authorities, the court further said: "Under the Missouri
law, where injuries are negligently caused and the negligence is of such an aggravated
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'To allow one to insure oneself against the punishment intended in a
verdict for punitive damages would be to defeat the purpose of the law
in such case made and provided. To enforce the contract sued on in
this case and to protect the appellee against punishment would be the
same as to permit a defendant in a criminal case, after having been
tried and convicted and sentenced to confinement either in a jail or a
penitentiary, to substitute another in his stead.' 60
The court, however, went on to rule against the insurance company and to
hold for coverage because in this case there was no direct or indirect par-
ticipation by the master in the commission of the servant's act. The court
reasoned that no public policy would be violated by protecting the master
from the unauthorized action of his servant.
The first Missouri state court decision on point is Crull v. Gleb.61 As
distinguished from the situation in Ohio Casualty Insurance, in Crull the
insured was also the. wrongdoer. The insurance company argued that,
under the terms of the policy, it was not liable for exemplary damages as-
sessed against its insured. The court decided in favor of the insurance com-
pany on the basis of construction of the policy language and on public
policy. Noting that the chief purposes of punitive damages are punishment
and deterrence, the court said:
This being true, it seems only just that the burden of paying punitive
damages should rest ultimately, as well as nominally, on the party
who actually committed the wrong. If the defendant Gleb was per-
mitted to shift to garnishee the burden of the punitive damage award,
then the award would have served no purpose. Plaintiff would have
already been made whole through his compensatory damages, and the
insurance company, which had done no wrong, would be punished.
There is no language in the policy that provides for the payment of
judgments for punitive damages.
Our highway safety problems have greatly increased. Death and
destruction stalk our roads. The peaceful Sunday afternoon family
drive through the hills has been abandoned by many as the result of
brushes with near death at the hands of half-baked morons drunkenly
weaving in and out of traffic at 80 or 90 miles per hour.
Criminal charges, convictions, and fines, are not a complete answer.
These may be some atonement to society by the offender, but they have
little deterring effect on others. In order for the theory of punitive
damages . . . to work, the delinquent driver must not be able to
transfer his responsibility for punitive damages to others.62
Connecticut. Following the federal court decision in Ohio Casualty Insur-
ance Co., the next case of importance is Tedesco v. Maryland Casualty
Co.,63 arising in Connecticut. As noted above, under Connecticut law the
form or attended by such circumstances as to be wanton and reckless in character,
punitive damages are authorized." Id. However, punitive damages are not generally
awarded, even in Missouri, solely because the negligence is of an aggravated form.
See notes 61-62 infra, and accompanying text.
60 75 F.2d at 60.
61 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
62 Id. at 23.
63 127 Conn. 533, 18 A.2d 357 (1941).
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purpose of exemplary damages is not to punish the wrongdoer but rather
to compensate the plaintiff for his injuries. The issue in Tedesco did not
concern punitive damages per se, but rather dealt with an award under a
Connecticut statute allowing multiple damages for injuries resulting from
willful violation of traffic regulations. Presumably, however, there is no prac-
tical difference between penalties established by legislatures and those es-
tablished by the courts with respect to pertinent coverage provisions of
insurance policies and applicable public policy. The court based its decision
against coverage on both construction of the policy language and public pol-
icy. The court stated: "A policy which permitted an insured to recover
from the insurer fines imposed for a violation of a criminal law would cer-
tainly be against public policy. The same would be true of a policy which
expressly covered an obligation of the insured to pay a sum of money in no
way representing injuries or losses suffered by the plaintiff but imposed as
a penalty because of a public wrong. ' 64  The court went on to say that
the policy language imposing liability upon the insurance company for dam-
ages "because of bodily injury" clearly did not cover the penalty sum, but
that if the language of the policy were susceptible to two constructions, that
construction consistent with public policy should be adopted.
Florida. The best reasoned statement on the public policy point is Judge
Wisdom's scholarly opinion for the Fifth Circuit in Northwestern National
Casualty Co. v. McNulty.65 The facts in McNulty are those upon which
a strong statement of public policy would be readily generated. The insur-
ance company issued a family combination automobile policy to Smith, a
resident of Virginia. Smith was involved in an accident in Florida while in
a drunken condition, traveling in excess of eighty miles an hour, and weav-
ing from side to side on the highway. He attempted to pass an automobile
driven by plaintiff McNulty where it was impossible to pass. He lost control
of his car, smashed into the rear of McNulty's car, and fled the scene with-
out stopping to render aid. Smith was arrested some twelve miles down the
highway after his car had run out of gas. McNulty suffered severe per-
sonal injuries, including permanent brain damage. McNulty sued Smith
in Florida state court and recovered both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, and then brought an ancillary garnishment action against Smith's
insurer, Northwestern National Casualty Company, in federal district court.
Following the district court decision in favor of McNulty, the insurance
company appealed to the Fifth Circuit from the portion of the judgment
of the garnishment proceeding allowing recovery of exemplary damages un-
der the insurance policy. The insurance company argued both that the
language of the policy did not cover exemplary damages, and that, even if
the policy construction would permit coverage, such coverage would violate
public policy. The court based its holding against coverage entirely upon
64 18 A.2d at 359.
65 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
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the public policy argument.66 The court stated that the fundamental pur-
poses of exemplary damages are punishment and deterrence, and, accord-
ingly, the burden of paying such damages should rest upon the wrongdoer.
The court said that to rule otherwise would frustrate the basic purposes
of exemplary damages, and noted that an attempt to shift the burden to the
insurance company would, in reality, shift that burden to the public through
increased insurance premiums. Society would then be punishing itself.
Judge Wisdom expressed the opinion of the court as follows:
Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains
a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanc-
tions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against
criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy.
The same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance
against the civil punishment that punitive damages represent.6 7
And further:
Considering the theory of punitive damages as punitory and as a deter-
rent and accepting as common knowledge the fact that death and
injury by automobile is a problem far from solved by traffic regulations
and criminal prosecutions, it appears to us that there are especially
strong public policy reasons for not allowing socially irresponsible au-
tomobile drivers to escape the element of personal punishment in puni-
tive damages when they are guilty of reckless slaughter or maiming
on the highway. It is no answer to say, society imposes criminal
sanctions to deter wrongdoers; that it is enough when a civil offender,
through insurance, pays what he is adjudged to owe. A criminal
conviction and payment of a fine to the state may be atonement to so-
ciety for the offender. But it may not have a sufficient effect on the
conduct of others to make the public policy in favor of punitive dam-
ages useful and effective . . . . To make that policy useful and ef-
fective the delinquent driver must not be allowed to receive a windfall
at the expense of the purchasers of insurance, transferring his responsi-
bility for punitive damages to the very people-the driving public-to
whom he is a menace. We are sympathetic with the innocent victim
here; perhaps there is no such thing as money damages making him
whole. But his interest in receiving non-compensatory damages is
small compared with the public interest in lessening the toll of injury
and death on the highways; and there is such a thing as a state policy
to punish and deter by making the wrongdoer pay.( 8
66 Through a process of negative reasoning, it might be asserted that by not con-
sidering the policy language issue the court indicated that it was of the opinion that
construction of the insurance policy would permit coverage of exemplary damages.
However, it is more plausible that the court felt its public policy position to be so strong
that the language of the policy was irrelevant.
67 307 F.2d 432, 440 (5th Cir. 1962).
68 Id. at 441-42. It would seem that the court is standing on a very weak leg of
its public policy argument when it asserts that denying coverage of exemplary damages
under liability policies will have a deterrent effect on reckless driving. See Judge
Gewin's specially concurring opinion in McNulty:
All of us are concerned with the high death toll and personal injuries oc-
curring on the highways, but I am somewhat skeptical that the prohibition
of insurance against liability for punitive damages will accomplish the
results expected by the majority. There is no certain measuring stick to
determine the effectiveness with which the law operates in a given field,
but all the states have rather strict criminal laws relating to the operation
of motor vehicles. If the criminal penalties provided by such statutes
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The question of coverage of exemplary damages by an automobile liabil-
ity insurance policy presented itself for the first time in the Florida state
courts in Nicholson v. American Fire & Casualty Insurance Co.69 The
Florida court cited McNulty with approval and based its decision in favor
of the insurance company entirely upon public policy, saying that by so
doing the question of interpretation of the policy need not be reached.
The Fifth Circuit later placed a limitation on its holding in McNulty.
In Ging v. American Liberty Insurance Co.,'70 arising in Florida, the court
held that where the insurance company did actually undertake the complete
defense of its insured in an action for both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages, the insurance company must either act in good faith toward its insured
in the entire undertaking, including the claim for exemplary damages, or
be liable for such exemplary damages assessed against its insured. The
court said that the McNulty decision should not be read as giving the insur-
ance company a license to act in bad faith toward its insured with respect
to punitive damages. In Ging, after undertaking to defend the entire suit
and with the knowledge that assessment of punitive damages would be prob-
able if the case were taken to trial, the insurance company refused an offer
to settle within policy limits. The court implied that the insurance company
did not act in good faith in refusing the settlement offer and also that it did
not make full and fair disclosure to its insured of the settlement negotiations
and of their status. Ging would indicate that the public policy in favor
of fairness and diligence on the part of the insurance company in defending
a claim against its insured overrides the public policy considerations against
allowing the insured to pass his exemplary damage assessment to the in-
surance company. It should serve as a warning to insurance companies, in
those jurisdictions holding against liability coverage of exemplary damages,
that any undertaking to defend against claims involving exemplary damages
should be undertaken with caution and full and fair disclosure to insureds.71
Two recent Florida cases illustrate that Florida is consistent with the
strong majority rule in this country on the question of whether a liability
insurance policy covers exemplary damages when assessed against an in-
sured who is only vicariously liable for such damages. In Sterling Insur-
ance Co. v. Hughes72 a Florida court held in favor of coverage in a situation
where the insured was only vicariously liable. But in Commercial Union
Insurance Co. v. Reichard7 s the federal district court, applying Florida law,
fail to deter the wrongdoers, I seriously doubt that closing the market
to insurance coverage will do so. As a matter of fact, it is my judgment
that the opposite result will follow.
Id. at 444.
69 177 So. 2d 52 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965).
70423 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1970).
71 The Court based its holding on the conduct of the insurance company after the
company had undertaken defense of the entire claim. The court specifically said that
it did not intimate any holding as to whether an insurer has a duty initially to under-
take defense of the exemplary damages aspect of a claim involving both exemplary
and compensatory damages.
72 187 So. 2d 898 (Fla. Ct. App. 1966).
73 262 F. Supp. 275 (S.D. Fla. 1966). Although the court granted a partial sum-
mary judgment in this case, it was reversed at 273 F. Supp. 952 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
While the principle of law upon which the original judgment was granted was affirmed,
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held that where the insured was more than vicariously liable, the liability
policy did not cover exemplary damages assessed against the insured. The
court said that, under circumstances where the insured authorizes or par-
ticipates in the wrong, or knows in advance or should so know that his
servant will or is likely to commit the wrong, the law will not permit such
an employer to insure himself against exemplary damages for the wrongful
conduct of his servant.
New Jersey. Although presumably not exactly on point, the 1964 New
Jersey decision in LoRocco v. New Jersey Manufacturers Indemnity Insur-
ance Co.7 4 does bear on this discussion. The pertinence of the case is ques-
tionable because it is unclear from the facts whether exemplary damages
were assessed against the insured because of wanton conduct or because
of intentional acts. In holding against coverage of the exemplary damages
under the insurance policy, the court would appear to have based its deci-
sion on public policy against allowing an insured to insure against his inten-
tional wrongs. If this is true, much of the question of liability coverage for
exemplary damages under New Jersey law remains open.
The noteworthy point of LoRocco is that the court placed a reasonable
limitation on the rule in Ging. LoRocco was a declaratory judgment action
against New Jersey Manufacturers Indemnity Insurance Company brought
subsequent to a successful personal injury action by plaintiff LoRocco against
the company's insured. In the prior action, plaintiff did not demand ex-
emplary damages in its petition, but during the trial requested and received
a trial amendment pleading for exemplary damages. In the subsequent de-
claratory judgment action LoRocco alleged that, because the insurance com-
pany controlled defense of the entire case, including the claim for exemplary
damages, the insurance company was estopped to deny liability for such
damages. The court held:
When the ambiguous pretrial order was amended after plaintiffs had
completed presentation of their evidence, to clarify the issues and to
manifest expressly for the first time that plaintiffs were also seeking
punitive damages, the insurance company immediately objected to the
amendment, pleaded surprise, disclaimed any responsibility for puni-
tive damages, notified the insured and its driver that it would not de-
fend them against such a claim and was withdrawing from that phase
of the case, so that they might engage separate counsel to represent
them, and then continued the defense upon the express understand-
ing . . . that it would be answerable only for compensatory dam-
ages. Continuing to represent defendants under those circumstances
did not make the insurance company liable to pay punitive damages.
. . . The insured having by acquiescence accepted defense by the
insurance company, with full knowledge of its disclaimer, the car-
rier may defend an action by a third party upon the policy, and if
it appears that there is no coverage, there can be no recovery.75
the court reversed the summary judgment because of the existence of an issue of mate-
rial fact.
74 82 N.J. Super. 323, 197 A.2d 591 (1964).
75 197 A.2d at 595. Initially, the defendants in this action were the employee driver
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Pennsylvania. In 1966 the question of exemplary damages and liability
insurance coverage was presented for the first time in Pennsylvania by Es-
mond v. Liscio.7 Although the court noted the policy language regarding
coverage, 77 it based its entire decision against coverage on the public policy
against permitting a tortfeasor to shift exemplary damages to his insurer.
The court concluded that under Pennsylvania law the purposes of exemplary
damages are punishment and deterrence, and that Pennsylvania follows
the orthodox view that exemplary damages are in no sense compensatory.
After quoting extensively from Judge Wisdom's opinion in McNulty, the
court said:
When socially irresponsible drivers are guilty of reckless and grossly
offensive conduct on the highways, there are sound and compelling
policy reasons for not allowing them to escape the element of personal
punishment in punitive damages. To permit insurance against the
sanction of punitive damages would be to permit such offenders to
purchase a freedom of misconduct altogether inconsistent with the
theory of civil punishment which such damages represent.78
Kansas. The next case of importance is Chief Judge Murrah's decision for
the Tenth Circuit in American Surety Co. v. Gold,79 arising under Kansas
law. In Gold the insurance company argued against liability for punitive
damages on the grounds that such damages were not covered by the lan-
guage of the policy, and in the alternative, that such coverage would be
against public policy. Noting that the courts of Kansas had not spoken
on either of these points, the court expressly avoided the "troublesome ques-
tion of coverage," 80 and based its entire decision against coverage on public
policy, citing with approval the McNulty decision. The insured argued that
the insurance company was estopped to deny coverage because it had un-
dertaken to defend the entire claim, including both compensatory and ex-
emplary damages. The court summarily rejected this argument, saying that
the insurance company had timely placed the insured upon notice that the
company did not consider itself liable for the punitive damages, and the in-
sured had signed an authorization for "claim service and non-waiver of
rights" of the insurance company. The court said that the short answer
to the insured's contention was covered by the following language from the
McNulty decision: "The doctrines of estoppel and waiver do not in general
apply in transactions that are forbidden by statute or that are contrary to
public policy . . ."81 and, "since public policy forbids an insured to enter
of the vehicle and his dairy company employer. The question of exemplary damage
coverage under the employer's liability policy did not arise, however, because, after
plaintiffs presented their evidence, the action against the employer was dismissed on
the grounds that the employee driver was not acting as an agent of the employer at
the time of the accident.
76 209 Pa. Super. 200, 224 A.2d 793 (1966).
77 "The policy further provides: 'The company will pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because
of: A. Bodily injury . . . caused by accident ...... 224 A.2d at 795.
78 Id. at 799.
79 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
80 Id. at 525.
81 Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1962),
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into an insurance contract covering punitive damages, public policy forbids
the accomplishment of the result by an estoppel.
'8 2
The court in Gold also rejected the insured's contention that the Kansas
Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act83 superseded any state public policy
forbidding insurance against punitive damages. The court simply said that
the purpose of the Act was to provide compensation for innocent victims
of motor vehicle accidents, and under Kansas law, exemplary damages are
punitive and have nothing to do with compensation.
New York. Teska v. Atlantic National Insurance Co.8 4 was a case of first
impression in New York, in which the only question before the court was
whether the insurer under a standard automobile accident insurance policy
was required to pay punitive damages awarded against its insured. Citing
with approval Judge Murrah's opinion in Gold, the court held that cover-
age of punitive damages was against the public policy of the State of New
York. The court met the insured's contention that this public policy was
superseded by the Motor Vehicle Financial Security Act of New York85 with
the following language:
It is clear therefore, that the holdings in the various jurisdictions is
[sic] that where there is compulsory insurance, it is not against public
policy to require the insurance company to be liable for damages as a
result of reckless, wanton or wilful acts of the insured, provided those
damages are to compensate the injured party for his injuries. Where,
however, as in the State of New York punitive damages are awarded
for wilful or reckless negligence over and above compensatory dam-
ages, then such a holding would be against public policy. Under
those circumstances the punitive damages awarded are to punish the
defendant and not to compensate the plaintiff.80
Arizona. The most recent case holding against coverage of exemplary
damages by a liability insurance policy is the Arizona Court of Appeals
decision in Price v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. 87 Citing extensively
from the McNulty decision, the court held that the public policy of Arizona
prevents an insurance company from paying an exemplary damage award
assessed against its insured when the insured has participated in the mis-
conduct.
The court recognized that some jurisdictions have found no public policy
prohibition against allowing such coverage of exemplary damages, their ar-
gument against Judge Wisdom's reasoning in McNulty being: (1) that be-
cause criminal laws have failed to decrease reckless driving significantly, it
is very speculative whether closing the insurance market will so do; (2)
quoting Montsdoca v. Highlands Bank & Trust Co., 85 Fla. 158, 95 So. 666, 668
(1923).
82 307 F.2d at 442.
83 KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 8-722 to -762 (1972).
84 59 Misc. 2d 615, 300 N.Y.S.2d 375 (Dist. Ct. 1969).
85 N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW §§ 310-21 (McKinney 1970).
86 300 N.Y.S.2d at 378-79.
87 16 Ariz. App. 511, 494 P.2d 711 (1972).
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that the language of insurance policies covering "all damages arising out
of the negligent operation of automobiles" should be liberally construed in
favor of the insured; and (3) that in most cases the whim of the jury will
govern the extent of coverage and the jury cannot accurately make the dis-
tinction between ordinary and gross negligence.88 In response to these con-
tentions the court stated:
[1] The first argument assumes, without supporting evidence, that
absent criminal sanction, the rate and severity of highway accidents
would be unchanged. We see no basis for such an assumption. In
Arizona, the purpose of punitive damages is not to compensate the
injured plaintiff but rather to punish the defendant for his misconduct.
: , . Permitting a wrongdoer to shift the burden of payment to an
insurance company would negate the very purpose of punitive dam-
ages, i.e., punishment.
[2] Strongly entrenched in our law is the proposition that am-
biguous language in insurance contracts must be liberally interpreted
in favor of the insured and against the insurer. . . . This proposi-
tion has no applicability to the case at bar inasmuch as the trial court
determined that the policy language covered punitive damage awards.
We are asked herein only to determine whether public policy voids
such coverage.
[3] The third argument is in essence an attack on our jury sys-
tem. We must assume that a jury will follow the instructions and cor-
rectly decide the issues presented, in the absence of a clear showing
to the contrary. Such possible discrepancies are best handled on a
case-by-case basis and do not detract from the conclusion reached
herein.89
The court further held that the financial responsibility laws of the State
of Arizona were not in conflict with the court's conclusions in the case.
The court said that the purpose of such laws is to insure compensation of
innocent victims of automobile accidents and "not to insulate reckless driv-
ers from possible punitive damage awards."' 0
B. Cases Allowing Coverage
Alabama. Other than the Eighth Circuit decision in Ohio Casualty Insurance
Co. v. Welfare Finance Co.,9' the earliest decision in favor of liability insur-
ance coverage of punitive damages is that of the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama in American Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Werfel. 92 Alabama decisions
such as Werfel and Capital Motor Lines v. Loring9 3 are of little value as
precedent to other jurisdictions on the question of indemnity against puni-
tive damages. These cases are wrongful death actions, and, under the
unique Alabama wrongful death statutory scheme,9 4 all damages arising in
88 494 P.2d at 713-14.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 714.
91 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 734 (1935); see notes 57-60
supra, and accompanying text.
92 230 Ala. 552, 162 So. 103, af'd, 231 Ala. 285, 164 So. 383 (1935).
93 238 Ala. 260, 189 So. 897 (1939).
94 ALA. CODE tit. 7, § 123 (1960).
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wrongful death actions are regarded as purely punitive, even though they
perform a compensatory function.
However, an interesting decision of the Supreme Court of Alabama,
Employers Insurance Co. v. Brock,95 may place Alabama generally among
those jurisdictions holding in favor of coverage of punitive damages under a
liability insurance policy. In Brock the action arose under the Alabama
automobile guest statute rather than under the wrongful death statute. The
guest statute of Alabama does not incorporate the unique treatment of puni-
tive damages of the wrongful death statute. Accordingly, by holding in fa-
vor of coverage of punitive damages, the court extended the holdings in
Werfel and Loring to actions arising under the guest statute, and possibly,
to general situations involving punitive damages. The actual meaning of
the court's decision in Brock is unclear. The court gave no reasons for its
decision, and, although it obliquely cited Werfel, it made no distinction be-
tween the situation in Brock and that in Werfel.
Kentucky. The next case in time holding in favor of coverage of exemplary
damages by a liability insurance policy is the Kentucky intermediate appel-
late court decision in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Baker.96 As with the Ala-
bama cases, the Baker case is of little value as precedent to other jurisdic-
tions because of a particular state statute. In a prior action, the plaintiff
Baker had recovered a judgment for personal injuries against the insured,
a taxicab owner and operator, for an assault by an employee taxi driver.
The action resulted in a judgment for both compensatory and punitive dam-
ages. The judgment was not satisfied and plaintiff brought a subsequent
action against the insured's insurance companies. The court held that the
punitive damages were covered by two automobile liability insurance poli-
cies issued to the taxicab owner under a Kentucky statute requiring finan-
cial responsibility of the holders of permits to operate taxicabs. The court
did not rest its decision on public policy, but rather on the language of the
statute which protected passengers against damages resulting from "any act
or omission connected with the operation of motor vehicles," and which in-
sured the payment of "any final judgment" rendered against the operator
of the taxi on account of such damage.97
Tennessee. The first case directly on point holding in favor of coverage
of exemplary damages by a liability insurance policy is the Sixth Circuit
opinion in General Casualty Co. of America v. Woodby.98 The pertinent
portion of the policy in Woodby obligated the insurance company "to pay on
behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall become obligated to
pay by reason of the liability . . .imposed upon him by law, (a) for dam-
ages . . .sustained . . .by any person . . ... 9 The insurance company
contended that this language did not obligate it to pay the exemplary dam-
95 233 Ala. 551, 172 So. 671 (1937).
96 304 Ky. 296, 200 S.W.2d 757 (Ct. App. 1947).
97 200 S.W.2d at 761.
98 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956).
99 Id. at 457.
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ages assessed against its insured because they are penalties rather than true
"damages." The company supported its position with authorities holding
that intentionally inflicted injuries are not accidental injuries under liability
insurance policies. The court held that injuries from gross or wanton neg-
ligence are not the same as injuries caused intentionally; therefore, punitive
damages are liabilities imposed by law for damages within the meaning of
the policy. The court based its entire decision on construction of the policy
language and made no mention of public policy.
In Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Insurance Co.100 the Supreme
Court of Tennessee upheld the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit in Woodby.
The pertinent policy provision in Lazenby reads as follows: "Coverage A-
Bodily Injury Liability. To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which
the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages because of
bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death at anytime resulting
therefrom sustained by any person caused by accident and arising out of
ownership, maintenance or use of the automobile."'' 1  The court admitted
that the primary purposes of punitive damages in Tennessee are punishment
and deterrence, and noted and cited extensively from the Fifth Circuit de-
cision in McNulty. However, it declined to follow McNulty for three rea-
sons. First, the court said that, although it accepted as common knowledge
the fact that highway accidents and resulting deaths and injuries are a very
serious problem, it was "not able to agree [that] the closing of the insur-
ance market, on the payment on punitive damages, to such drivers would
necessarily accomplish the result of deterring them in their wrongful con-
duct."'1 02 Second, the court said that the language in the insurance policy
had been construed by most courts to cover punitive damages and it was its
opinion that the average policy holder, after reading the language, would
believe he was protected against all claims not intentionally inflicted. Third,
the court said that to deny coverage of punitive damages would be to void
in part the contract between the insurance company and its insured. Con-
sidering all factors, it found no persuasive public policy reasons for such
action, because partial voiding of private contracts should not be done ex-
cept in the clearest of cases.
South Carolina. The 1957 Fourth Circuit decision in Pennsylvania Thresh-
ermen & Farmers' Mutual Casualty Insurance Co. v. Thornton,'03 arising in
South Carolina, is one of the more frequently cited decisions holding in favor
of coverage. During trial, and again on appeal, the insurance company con-
tended against liability on the questionable basis that punitive damages are
assessed for willful acts, rather than negligence, and the insurance policy
covered negligent but not intentional acts. The court summarily rejected
this contention, noting that negligent conduct may be of such a gross nature
as to be characterized as wanton and willful for purposes of assessing puni-
10 0 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
101 383 S.W.2d at 2.
102 Id. at 5.
103 244 F.2d 823 (4th Cir. 1957).
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tive damages and yet fall far short of intentional wrongdoing. The court
went on to say:
Punitive damages are not limited to assaults and batteries, and the
award of such damages does not convert the case into an assault and
battery. To allow the appellant's argument would lead to the illogical
and indefensible result, contrary to the purpose and spirit of liability
insurance policies, which are designed to protect members of the
public, that the more extreme the recklessness the more likely the in-
surer would be to escape liability.104
This decision has received much attention, primarily because it was ren-
dered after the persuasive Fifth Circuit decision in McNulty and, indeed,
expresses a contrary policy. It should be noted, however, that the court's
policy statement is in response to a highly questionable contention by the
insurance company. One can only wonder how the court would have re-
sponded to more persuasive public policy arguments, had they been pre-
sented.
Of greater interest is the 1965 Supreme Court of South Carolina decision
in Carroway v. Johnson.105 In Carroway the court based its holding en-
tirely upon construction of the policy language: "To pay on behalf of the
insured all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as
damages because of: A. bodily injury . . .sustained by any person . . .
arising out of the. . . use of the owned automobile or any non-owned auto-
mobile ... ,"106 Although the court noted that, under the well settled rule
of policy construction, all ambiguities must be construed most liberally in
favor of the insured, it did not specifically find any ambiguity in the quoted
language. The court observed that the policy language obligated the insur-
ance company to pay "all sums" which the insured was legally obligated to
pay as damages, and punitive damages are sums required to be paid as
damages, but said that the question of whether or not punitive damages
are "damages because of bodily injury" was a more difficult question. After
quoting Appleman' 0 7 with approval to the effect that the average insured
contemplates coverage of all claims arising out of his use of his automobile,
including punitive damages, the court decided that the language of the insur-
ance policy, granting coverage for all damages arising because of bodily in-
jury, was sufficiently broad to cover liability for punitive damages.
Arkansas. The Arkansas Supreme Court in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Daniel'08 held in favor of coverage of punitive damages
under a standard automobile liability policy both on the basis of policy con-
struction and on public policy. In the comprehensive automobile policy in
question the company agreed:
104 Id. at 827.
105 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
106 139 S.E.2d at 909.
107 7 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, § 4312, at 132-33.
108 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969).
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To pay on behalf of the insured all sums which the insured shall
become legally obligated to pay as damages:
Coverage A. Because of bodily injuries sustained by any person,
and
Coverage B. Because of injury to or destruction of property, caused
by accident and arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or use of
any automobile, including loading and unloading thereof.' 09
The court noted that under Arkansas law no recovery for punitive damages
is allowed unless substantial actual damages are suffered. 110 Accordingly,
with somewhat curious reasoning, the court held that, because a defendant
cannot become legally obligated to pay punitive damages unless actual dam-
ages have also been assessed, punitive damages do constitute sums, under
the provisions of the policy in question, which the insured shall become
legally obligated to pay as damages because of bodily injuries sustained.
The court went further, holding that it could find nothing under Arkansas
public policy which would prohibit coverage of punitive damages by the in-
surance policy in question:
Since we have permitted punitive damages to be assessed against
an employer under the doctrine of respondeat superior even in the
absence of the employer's knowledge or authorization of the em-
ployee's acts, we can perceive of no good reason why an employer
should be prohibited from insuring himself against such losses, since
the losses are in effect a business loss-i.e. a calculated risk of doing
business."'
Texas. The most recent decision in favor of coverage of punitive damages
by an automobile liability insurance policy is that of the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals in Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wallgren." 2
In reaching its decision the court rejected the insurance company's conten-
tion that such coverage would violate public policy of the state and held
that the policy language clearly covered punitive damages. In rejecting the
public policy argument, the court stated that public policy is reflected by
expressions of state constitutions, state statutes, and judicial decisions, which
are often enlarged to include the administrative practices of state officers.
Accordingly, since a state administrative agency, the Texas Insurance Com-
mission, had prescribed and approved the policy language in question, the
court summarily held that such policy language reflected public policy and,
therefore, was incapable of violating it. In considering whether the policy
language covered punitive damages, the court quoted the following portion
of the policy: "[The company is obligated to] pay on behalf of the insured
all sums which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as dam-
ages because of: . . .bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death
109 440 S.W.2d at 583.
11OSee Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 234 Ark. 347, 352 S.W.2d 96 (1961); Miller v.
Blanton, 213 Ark. 246, 210 S.W.2d 293 (1948); Kroger Grocery & Baking Co. v.
Reeves, 210 Ark. 178, 194 S.W.2d 876 (1946).
"M 440 S.W.2d at 584.
112 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e., noted in
10 Hous. L. REv. 192 (1972).
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resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury,' sustained by any per-
son. . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the owned au-
tomobile or any non-owned automobile .... 1113 Citing a local secondary
source 1 4 and the Sixth Circuit decision in General Casualty Co. of America
v. Woodby, 1 5 the court held that the above language clearly covered puni-
tive damages.
II. THE TEXAS VIEW: A TWOFOLD ANALYSIS
The foregoing decisions would indicate that there is no judicial trend in
this country with respect to the issue of coverage of punitive damages under
liability insurance policies. Judicial decisions over the past decade which
represent cases of first impression in their respective jurisdictions have di-
vided about equally on the matter. The scope and purposes of punitive
damages vary significantly among jurisdictions, and accordingly, close analy-
sis of the problem should be confined to a particular jurisdiction, with
guidance taken where appropriate flom decisions in other jurisdictions. This
Article will concern itself illustratively from this point with Texas law. Never-
theless, most of the comments can be applied with equal force to other
jurisdictions. To begin, two nutshell generalizations should be made. First,
under the clear wording of pertinent coverage provision of automobile lia-
bility insurance policies, punitive damage coverage is not contracted for.
However, serious argument can be made in favor of construing such policies
so as to provide coverage of punitive damages. Second, whether or not the
policy is interpreted in favor of such coverage, either interpretation is con-
sistent with public policy. This second proposition is especially true in those
jurisdictions, such as Texas, which attribute a compensatory as well as a pun-
itive function to exemplary damages. 61
A. Punitive Damages and Construction of the Insurance Policy
The pertinent language of the Texas standard automobile liability insur-
ance policy reads as follows:
[The company is obligated to] pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of: . . . bodily injury, sickness or disease, including death
resulting therefrom, hereinafter called 'bodily injury', sustained by any
person; . . . arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the
owned automobile or any non-owned automobile . ... 11
In Dairyland County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Wallgren"18 a Texas court
concluded that this policy language clearly covered punitive damages as-
113 477 S.W.2d at 343.
114 Brin, supra note 42, at 265.
115 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956).
116 For a general survey of the position of each state in this regard, see H. OLECK,
DAMAGES TO PERSONS AND PROPERTY § 269, at 540.1 (1957).
117 Dairyland County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wallgren, 477 S.W.2d 341, 343 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
118 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
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sessed against the insured. The court reasoned that punitive damages are
liabilities imposed upon an insured as damages within the policy provision
binding the insurer to pay "all sums which the insured shall become legally
obligated to pay as damages." In support of its conclusion, the court cited
General Casualty Co. of America v. Woodby"19 and quoted as follows from
an article by Mr. Royal Brin: "Certainly it is difficult to quarrel with this
conclusion as an interpretation of the language of the policy, and those courts
and commentators which espouse non-coverage usually do so on the basis
of public policy rather than of construction of the policy language. '120 The
exact opposite would seem to be true. From the four corners of the instru-
ment, it is virtually impossible to construe the language in favor of cover-
age of punitive damages. It is certainly true that punitive damages are
sums levied against the insured as damages and the insurance company has
contracted to pay all sums which the insured becomes legally obligated to
pay as damages. But the coverage provision goes on to qualify coverage
in terms of damages assessed because of "bodily injury." Under no rea-
sonable interpretation can punitive damages be said to be assessed because
of bodily injury.
Further, a perusal of the cases prior to Dairyland County which have
considered the question of punitive damages and liability insurance will
show that ten of the decisions have been based, at least in part, on construc-
tion of the policy language. Of these decisions, five were in favor of cov-
erage 121 and five against.'22
The courts which have held that punitive damages are beyond the cov-
erage provisions of liability insurance policies have unanimously based their
decisions on the reasoning that punitive damages are not assessed because
of bodily injury. The courts interpreting the pertinent provisions of the re-
spective policies in favor of coverage of punitive damages have varied con-
siderably in their reasoning.
The Eighth Circuit, in Ohio Casualty Insurance Co. v. Welfare Finance
Co., stated: "Since this policy clearly covers bodily damage through negli-
gence and since these punitive damages are imposed because of the aggra-
vated circumstances or form of this negligence, such punitive damages must
be regarded as coming within the meaning of the policy.' 123 The court's
reasoning is simply not responsive to the question of whether punitive dam-
ages are imposed because of bodily injury. Nor is the court's position other-
wise sound. Punitive damages are not generally assessed because of ag-
gravated negligence, which of course is covered by the insurance policy,
119 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956).
120 Brin, supra note 42, at 265.
121 General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); Ohio
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Welfare Fin. Co., 75 F.2d 58 (8th Cir. 1934); Southern Farm Bureau
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582 (1969); Carroway v. Johnson,
245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965); Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214
Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
122 Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934); Gleason
v. Fryer, 30 Colo. App. 224, 491 P.2d 85 (1971); Brown v. Western Cas. & Sur. Co.,
484 P.2d 1252 (Colo. Ct. App. 1971); Tedesco v. Maryland Cas. Co., 127 Conn. 533,
18 A.2d 357 (1941); Crull v. Gleb, 382 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1964).
123 75 F.2d 58, 59 (8th Cir. 1934).
1973]
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
but rather because of the culpable state of mind evidenced by the tort-
feasor's actions. 124
Nor was the Sixth Circuit's answer responsive in General Casualty Co. of
America v. Woodby, 125 cited and referred to by the Texas court in Dairy-
land County.126  In Woodby the court said: "The policy in the present
cases obligated the appellants 'to pay on behalf of the insured all sums
which the insured shall become obligated to pay by reason of the liability
imposed upon him by law, (a) for damages * * * sustained * * * by
any person. * * *' . . . We are of the opinion that the punitive damages
awarded in these cases are liabilities imposed by law for damages within
the meaning of the policy.' 27 The quotation from the policy provision by
the Woodby court simply ignored the additional language in the standard
Texas policy-"because of bodily injury, sickness or disease.' '1 28
Another case arising, as did Woodby, in Tennessee, Lazenby v. Uni-
versal Underwriters Insurance Co.,129 quoted all of the pertinent policy lan-
guage in its decision, but, nevertheless, held against punitive damage cover-
age under the terms of the policy on the basis that most courts had so inter-
preted the policy provisions. The court further reasoned that the average
policy holder, upon reading the policy, would interpret the language to pro-
vide coverage in all instances except those of intentional wrongdoing. With
respect to the first argument, prior to 1964 only three courts had consid-
ered the question of construction of the policy language with respect to puni-
tive damages, two courts130 holding against and one in favor of coverage. 131
The court's second basis, although again not responsive to the question of
whether punitive damages are assessed because of bodily injury, is a sound
argument in favor of interpreting the policy language to include punitive
damage coverage. This argument will be discussed more fully below.
The Supreme Court of South Carolina, in Carroway v. Johnson,132 at least
candidly recognized the problem before artfully dodging it in reaching its
decision. The court noted that punitive damages are "sums which the in-
sured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages," but said that the
question of whether such damages are "damages because of bodily injury"
was more difficult. 133  After throwing up a smokescreen with the observa-
tion that ambiguities in insurance policies are to be interpreted in favor of
the insured, but without noting any ambiguity in the policy language, the
court said that the average insured would contemplate coverage of all claims
arising out of use of his automobile and held the language of the policy
sufficiently broad to include coverage of punitive damages. At least one
writer has explained the court's loose construction as simply being responsive
124 See text accompanying notes 31-34 supra.
125 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956).
126 477 S.W.2d 341 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972), error ref. n.r.e.
127 238 F.2d 452, 457-58 (6th Cir. 1956).
128 See text accompanying note 117 supra.
129 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
130 General Cas. Co. of America v. Woodby, 238 F.2d 452 (6th Cir. 1956); Lazenby
v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964).
131 Universal Indem. Ins. Co. v. Tenery, 96 Colo. 10, 39 P.2d 776 (1934).
132 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
133 139 S.E.2d at 910.
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to, and in conformity with, a state statute requiring that South Carolina lia-
bility insurance policies insure against loss from any liability imposed by
law for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle.' 3 4  If this explanation is valid, then the South Carolina decisions
are of little value as precedent to other jurisdictions on the question of
proper construction of pertinent policy provisions with respect to punitive
damage coverage.
The only case directly responsive to the question of whether punitive dam-
ages are imposed because of bodily injury is the Arkansas Supreme Court
decision in Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v. Daniel.'35 The
court reasoned that, because actual damages are a prerequisite to recovery
of punitive damages under Arkansas law, punitive damages are assessed
because of bodily injury. This conclusion suffers for several reasons. First,
the actual damage predicate to a recovery of punitive damages is a minority
rule in this country imposed for the purpose of limiting the circumstances
under which punitive damages may be recovered.' 3 6  In this instance, the
court is using the rule to expand rather than contract the availability of
punitive damages. Further, the court erroneously equates "actual damages"
to "bodily injury" under the terms of the policy. "Actual damages" is a
much broader concept including bodily injury, sickness, disease, and death,
covered by the policy provisions, as well as damages not covered under the
policy, such as those arising from injuries intentionally inflicted. Finally,
granting for the sake of argument that bodily injury is a prerequisite to
recovery of punitive damages under Arkansas law, it does not follow that,
in all cases in which bodily injury results, punitive damages are recoverable.
Accordingly, punitive damages would not be appropriate in a given case
"because of" bodily injury, but rather "because of" willful, wanton, or ma-
licious conduct.
Clearly, as long as construction of the policy language remains within
the four comers of the instrument, the conclusion is inescapable that puni-
tive damages are beyond the coverage provisions of the policy. However,
by going beyond the language of the policy itself, strong argument can be
made in favor of interpreting the policy to allow coverage of punitive dam-
ages.
An establishcd rule in this country regarding construction of insurance
contracts, as well as contracts of adhesion generally, is the proposition that
ambiguities in the contract documents are to be resolved against the party
responsible for the drafting. 137 In the case of insurance contracts the draft-
134 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 46-750.31, .32 (Supp. 1971); see Justice Fogleman's dissent
in Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582, 584
(1969).
135 Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co. v. Daniel, 246 Ark. 849, 440 S.W.2d 582(1969).(16 See generally DOBBS § 3.9, at 208-10; McCoRMICK § 83, at 293-95. The rule
also obtains in Texas. Fort Worth Elevators Co. v. Russell, 123 Tex. 128, 70 S.W.2d
397 (1934); Giraud v. Moore, 86 Tex. 675, 26 S.W. 945 (1894); McDonald v. Inter-
national & G.N. Ry., 86 Tex. 1, 22 S.W. 939 (1893); Traweek v. Martin-Brown Co.,
79 Tex. 460, 14 S.W. 564 (1890).
137 E.g., State Mut. Life Assur. Co. v. Heine, 141 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1944); Bonnie
v. Maryland Cas. Co., 280 Ky. 568, 133 S.W.2d 904 (1939); Inter-Southern Life Ins.
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ing party is the insurer. The principle holds true even in those jurisdictions,
such as Texas, where the autonomy of insurance companies in drafting insur-
ance policies has been largely usurped by legislative or administrative
bodies. 138  The reason is that even under such systems insurers continue
to exert a profound influence on policy drafting, the regulation by govern-
ment bodies being relatively weak and their approval of policy provisions
being largely influenced by proposals made by draftsmen representing insur-
ance companies. 13 9 Any argument, however, that the coverage provisions
of the standard automobile liability insurance policy are ambiguous with
respect to punitive damages is doomed to failure. In interpreting these
provisions in this context, only one court14 0 has raised the question and it
wisely moved on without attempting to point specifically to ambiguity. Nor
will it suffice to say that the policy provisions are ambiguous because the
provisions have been subject to contrary interpretations by different courts.
Such a statement clearly begs the question.
Simply stated, there is nothing inconsistent or patently ambiguous in the
words "all sums . . .as damages . . .because of: . . . bodily injury." To
contend that first saying "all sums" and then limiting such sums to those
arising because of bodily injury gives rise to ambiguity is to render the entire
exclusion section of a liability insurance policy a nullity. It has also been
argued that, if it had been the intention of the insurance company to exclude
liability for punitive damages from coverage, then logically such exclusion
would have been specifically stated, particularly in view of the numerous
conditions enumerated in the exclusion section of insurance policies. Such
an argument is not forceful. The purpose of the exclusion section is to limit
specific coverage granted under coverage provisions-for example, damages
arising from intentional wrongdoing. Since liability for punitive damages
is not contracted for by the coverage provisions, specific exclusion of puni-
tive damages would be inappropriate and superfluous.
But the broader principle which upholds the doctrine of resolving am-
biguities in favor of the insured can be used to make a strong argument in
favor of interpreting the language of insurance policies in favor of coverage
of punitive damages. Professor Keeton labels this broader principle "hon-
oring reasonable expectations" and defines it as follows: "The objectively
reasonable expectations of applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding
the terms of insurance contracts will be honored even though painstaking
study of the policy provisions would have negated those expectations.' 4'
Professor Keeton applauds the principle of honoring reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured for fairly requiring an interpretation of technical lan-
guage in lay terms and for realistically taking into account the fact that
most insureds do not read their policies. He persuasively documents judicial
Co. v. Duff, 184 Ky. 227, 211 S.W. 738 (1919); Continental Beneficial Ass'n v. Holt,
167 Ky. 806, 181 S.W. 648 (1916); Francis v. International Travelers' Ass'n, 260 S.W.
938 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1924), afI'd, 119 Tex. 1, 23 S.W.2d 282 (1930).
138 See R. KEETON, BASIC TEXT ON INSURANCE LAw § 2.10(b), at 69-73 (1971).
'39 Id. § 6.3, at 350.
140 Carroway v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908 (1965).
141 R. KEETON, supra note 138, § 6.3, at 351.
[Vol. 27
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
recognition of the principle as an unstated extension of the basic construc-
tion rule of resolving ambiguities in favor of the insured. 142 Indeed, two of
the five decisions interpreting coverage provisions to include punitive dam-
ages have done so, at least in part, Gn the theory of honoring the reasonable
expectations of the insured.
In Lazenby the court said:
The language in the insurance policy in the case at bar, which is
similar to many types of liability policies, has been construed by most
courts, as a matter of interpretation of the language of a policy,
to cover both compensatory and punitive damages. Since most courts
have so construed this language in the policy, we think the average
policy holder reading this language would expect to be protected against
all claims, not intentionally inflicted. 143
In Carroway the court quoted with approval and adopted as a basis for its
decision the following statement by Appleman:
However, it is clear that the average insured contemplates protection
against claims of any character caused by his operation of an automo-
bile, not intentionally inflicted. When so many states have guest
statutes in which the test of liability is made to depend upon willful
and wanton conduct, or when courts, in an effort to get away from
contributory negligence of the plaintiff, permit a jury to find a de-
fendant guilty of willful and wanton conduct where the acts would
clearly not fall within the common law definitions of those terms, the
insured expects and rightfully so, that his liability under those
circumstances will be protected by his automobile liability policy. With
this view the majority of courts have agreed, and have imposed lia-
bility upon the insurer even though the recovery was based upon will-
ful or wanton conduct, or even though the verdict may have included
punitive damages. 14 4
In summary, it is submitted that the coverage provisions of most, if not
all, automobile liability insurance policies on their face clearly exclude puni-
tive damages from coverage. Probably the only cogent argument in favor
of punitive damage coverage is the concept of honoring reasonable expecta-
tions of the insured. The question then remains whether, especially con-
sidering the forceful analysis of Judge Wisdom in the McNulty decision,
such coverage is violative of public policy.
142 See, e.g., the words of Judge Learned Hand in response to the argument of an
insurance company that a binding receipt for a life insurance premium unambiguously
postponed coverage until actual approval by the insurer of the application:
An underwriter might so understand the phrase, when read in its context,
but the application was not to be submitted to underwriters; it was to go
to persons utterly unacquainted with the niceties of life insurance, who
would read it colloquially. It is the understanding of such persons that
counts; and not one in a hundred would suppose that he would be cov-
ered, not 'as of the date of completion of Part B,' as the defendant prom-
ised, but only as of the date of approval.
Gaunt v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 160 F.2d 599, 601 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 849 (1947). See generally R. KEETON, supra note 138, at 6.3, at
350-61.
143 Lazenby v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1, 5
(1964).
144 7 J. APPLEMAN, supra note 48, § 4312, at 132-33, quoted in part in Carroway
v. Johnson, 245 S.C. 200, 139 S.E.2d 908, 910 (1965).
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B. Public Policy and Indemnification Against Punitive Damages
Judicial inquiry into the compatibility of indemnity against punitive dam-
ages with concepts of public policy has remained limited to the question of
the impact of such indemnity upon the fundamental purposes of punitive
damages. As long as the question is so limited, indemnity against punitive
damages is not violative of the public policy of the State of Texas and of at
least those other jurisdictions which attribute a compensatory as well as
punitive function to exemplary damages.145 With respect to the remaining
states, those holding to the orthodox view that the sole purposes of punitive
damages are punishment and deterrence, and in no event compensation,
the reasoning of Judge Wisdom in McNulty is inescapable.
It is certainly true that indemnification against liability for punitive dam-
ages can present serious inroads into the public interest. However, it is also
submitted that denial of such coverage may also infringe upon the interests
of the public. A fundamental purpose of punitive damages in modern society
is the furtherance of what Professor Dobbs calls the "bounty theory" or the
"private attorney general theory."'1 46 This proposition will be discussed
more fully below. Simply stated, public policy and indemnity for punitive
damages is a two-way street.
Texas adheres strongly to the fundamental rule of contract law that the
terms of private contracts are to be accorded the utmost respect by courts of
law and are not to be lightly set aside. For example, in one of its earliest
pronouncements on the subject of public policy and insurance contracts, the
Supreme Court of Texas spoke in the following terms:
It must not be forgotten that you are not to extend arbitrarily those
rules which say that a given contract is void as being against public
policy, because, if there is one thing which more than another public
policy requires, it is that men of full age and competent understand-
ing shall have the utmost liberty of contracting, and that their con-
tracts, when entered into freely and voluntarily, shall be held sacred,
and shall be enforced by courts of justice. Therefore you have this
paramount public policy to consider: That you are not lightly to inter-
fere with this freedom of contract.147
But even when mirrored against this fundamental principle, the Texas
court's reasoning in Dairyland County with respect to the issue of public policy
is simply not persuasive. The Texas Court of Civil Appeals not only ad-
hered to a highly questionable construction of the pertinent coverage provi-
sions of the insurance policy, but its reasoning with respect to applicable
public policy is circular and suffers under close scrutiny. After holding that,
145 What is public policy? See 13 Tax. JuR. 2D Contracts § 171, at 364-65(1960):
"'Public policy' is a vague and extremely broad term. Basically, it comprehends the
protection of the public or, in other words, the public good. 'Public policy' is determined
by the spirit of the law of the state, constitutional or statutory, and is derived not
only from the express enactments of the legislature, but also from the decisions of the
courts and the common law, insofar as it has not been altered by statute."
14 6 See text accompanying notes 13-16 supra.
147 Missouri K. & T. Ry. v. Carter, 95 Tex. 461, 476, 68 S.W. 159, 164 (1902),
quoting from Registering Co. v. Sampson, L.R. 19 Eq. 462, 465 (1875).
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under the terms of the policy, the insurance company had contracted for
liability for punitive damages assessed against its insured, the court held that
the contract did not violate public policy. The court reasoned that under
articles 5.06148 and 5.35149 of the Texas Insurance Code, the Texas State
Board of Insurance is empowered, by valid delegation of legislative author-
ity, to prescribe terms, conditions, and language of liability insurance poli-
cies. The court further reasoned that, because the terms of the liability in-
surance policy at issue had been prescribed and approved by the insurance
board, those terms reflected, and therefore were incapable of violating, the
public policy of the State of Texas.
By attributing to the Texas Insurance Board a questionable construction
of the coverage provisions of the insurance policy at issue the court has as-
sumed the major premise of its argument. There would appear from the
record to have been nothing before the court to indicate any position of the
insurance board on the matter. Realistically, it is highly unlikely that the
board ever considered the question of public policy and indemnity against
punitive damages when it prescribed the terms of the insurance policy.
Such a question is one of law, not one of insurance, and accordingly, is
beyond the board's expertise.
Further it would appear fallacious for the court to abdicate judicial re-
view of a fundamental question of law to an administrative body which must
be presumed to have no expertise with respect to questions of law. The
point can be made by analogy: if the court had determined, either on
grounds of public policy or on the basis of interpretation of the insurance
contract, that liability for punitive damages was beyond the coverage provi-
sions of the contract, could the Texas Insurance Board overrule the court's
decision? Surely not.
Under articles 5.06 and 5.35 of the Texas Insurance Code, the Texas
Insurance Board clearly has the authority to prescribe and approve "uni-
148 In addition to the duty of approving classifications and rates, the Board
shall prescribe policy forms for each kind of insurance uniform in all re-
spects except as necessitated by the different plans on which the various
kinds of insurers operate, and no insurer shall thereafter use any other
form in writing automobile insurance in this State; provided, however, that
any insurer may use any form of endorsement appropriate to its plan of
operation, provided such endorsement shall be first submitted to and
approved by the Board; and any contract or agreement not written into
the application and policy shall be void and of no effect and in violation
of the provisions of this subchapter, and shall be sufficient cause for revo-
cation of license of such insurer to write automobile insurance within this
State. Acts 1951, 52nd Leg., ch. 491.
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5.06 (Supp. 1972).
149 The Board shall make, promulgate and establish uniform policies of in-
surance applicable to the various risks of this State, copies of which uni-
form policies shall be furnished each company now or hereafter doing
business in this State. After such uniform policies shall have been estab-
lished and promulgated and furnished the respective companies doing
business in this State, such companies shall, within sixty (60) days after
the receipt of such forms of policies, adopt and use said form or forms
and no others; also all companies which may commence business in this
State after the adoption and promulgation of such forms of policies, shall
adopt and use the same and no other forms of policies. Acts. 1951, 52nd
Leg., ch. 491.
TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5.35 (Supp. 1972).
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form" or "standard" liability insurance policies. But it is a much different
proposition to read into articles 5.06 and 5.35 authority in the board to de-
cide core issues of public policy. By so interpreting these provisions, the
court's decision in Dairyland County fails to comport with a long and clear
line of Texas judicial authority delimiting the scope of valid legislative dele-
gation. In Commercial Standard Insurance Co. v. Board of Insurance Com-
missioners, the court said: "The board can exercise only the authority
conferred upon it by law 'in clear and unmistakable terms, and will not be
deemed to be given by implication, nor can it be extended by inference, but
must be strictly construed.' "150 Nothing in articles 5.06 or 5.35 can be
construed as giving, "in clear and unmistakable terms" or otherwise, the
board authority over fundamental questions of law or controlling issues of
public policy.
An even stricter statement limiting the scope of delegated legislative au-
thority is that of the Texas Supreme Court in Creager v. Hidalgo County
Water Improvement District No. 4: "Moreover, to authorize the supplying
of a power by implication, inference, or presumption of intention, it is not
sufficient that the act is advantageous or convenient to the major power
conferred, or even effectual in the exercise of it. The power to be sup-
plied by such process must be practically indispensable and essential in order
to execute the power actually conferred."''
Thus, it would seem clear that, by reading into articles 5.06 and 5.35 an
extension of the authority of the Texas State Board of Insurance to include
matters of public policy, the Dairyland County decision is contrary to strongly
entrenched principles delimiting legislative delegation of authority. The
wisdom of the foregoing principles and the weakness of the court's position
in Dairyland County is illustrated by the decision of the Supreme Court of
Texas in American Liberty Insurance Co. v. Ranzau,152 reached subse-
quently to the decision in Dairyland County. In Ranzau the court held
that the Texas State Board of Insurance "may not act contrary to but only
consistent with, and in furtherance of, . . . expressed statutory purposes
.. . .,, If the board may only act in a manner consistent with expressed
statutory purpose, then certainly the board must also act in conformity with
public policy. 154 And if the board is subject to this restriction, then surely
150 34 S.W.2d 343, 345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1930), error ref.; cf. Board of
Ins. Comm'rs v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 142 Tex. 630, 180 S.W.2d 906 (1944); Humble
Oil and Ref. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 133 Tex. 330, 128 S.W.2d 9 (1939).
151 283 S.W. 151, 152 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926), judgment adopted.
152 481 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1972).
153 Id. at 796-97.
154 Though there is authority to the contrary, assuming for the sake of argument
that an express exclusion of exemplary damages were to be interpreted as inconsistent
with the tenets of the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act then, under
Ranzau, the Board of Insurance would be powerless to amend the coverage provided
by the Responsibility Act to exclude coverage of punitive damages. And, under Dairy-
land County, the courts of this state would be powerless to hold indemnity against ex-
emplary damages to be violative of public policy, the courts having abdicated their
authority to the Texas Insurance Board, a body the supreme court subsequently held
without authority to act in the matter. The only recourse to resolving the dilemma
would be by way of legislative amendment providing express exclusion of punitive dam-
ages from coverage provided under the Texas Motor Vehicle Responsibility Act. Hay-
[Vol. 27
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
the courts of this state may review actions of the board and measure such
actions against public policy. The courts of Texas themselves also reflect,
and often establish, public policy, but their actions in this regard are contin-
ually subject to judicial review.
Finally, there is an interesting, and apparently irreconcilable, incon-
sistency between the public policy decision in Dairyland County and the
Texas rule regarding recovery of punitive damages against a decedent tort-
feasor's estate. The Texas courts have consistently held that there can be
no recovery of punitive damages against the estate of a decedent. The pur-
pose of exemplary damages is punishment, and the tortfeasor's death prior
to judgment will abate that part of an action for exemplary damages; 55
the tortfeasor can be punished no more. The analogy seems appropriate.
The estate of the decedent, composed of his own personal wealth, stands
in closer personal proximity, and, therefore, legal liability, to the decedent
than do the funds of his insurance company, such funds being the product
of the premium dollars of payers who are unrelated to the insured. And yet
the law in Texas is that the insured can pass on his liability for exemplary
damages to his insurance company, while his personal estate is immune from
similar liability. As previously noted, punitive damages are like the cha-
meleon, changing hue and color against the different backdrops of varying
legal issues. Analogy is doomed to failure, inconsistency of judicial treat-
ment being the hallmark of punitive damages.
In order to argue persuasively that indemnity against punitive damages
is not violative of public policy, it is necessary to circumvent Judge Wis-
dom's thorough and well-reasoned opinion in McNulty, the strength of
which lies in its simplicity. "It would seem that insurance against exemplary
damages frustrates their purposes."'1 6 Those purposes are punishment and
deterrence, and public policy
would seem to require that the damages rest ultimately as well [as]
nominally on the party actually responsible for the wrong. If that per-
son were permitted to shift the burden to an insurance company, puni-
tive damages would serve no useful purpose. Such damages do not
compensate the plaintiff for his injury, since compensatory damages
already have made the plaintiff whole. And there is no point in pun-
ishing the insurance company; it has done no wrong. In actual fact,
of course, and considering the extent to which the public is insured,
the burden would ultimately come to rest not on the insurance com-
panies but on the public, since the added liability to the insurance
companies would be passed along to the premium payers. Society
would then be punishing itself for the wrong committed by the in-
sured.l57
ing delegated to the Insurance Board its authority over prescribing terms of insurance
policies, it is unlikely that the state legislature would act in the matter. Such bizarre
results were surely not intended by the court in Dairyland County.
'55 Sears Roebuck & Co. v. Jones, 303 S.W.2d 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1957),
error ref. n.r.e.; Wright v. E-Z Fin. Co., 267 S.W.2d 602 (Texas Civ. App.-Dallas
1954), error ref. n.r.e.
156 H. OLECK, supra note 116, § 275C, at 560.




Where a person is able to insure himself against punishment he gains
a freedom of misconduct inconsistent with the establishment of sanc-
tions against such misconduct. It is not disputed that insurance against
criminal fines or penalties would be void as violative of public policy.
The same public policy should invalidate any contract of insurance
against the civil punishment that punitive damages represent. 158
Beginning with Judge Gewin's specially concurring opinion in McNulty
and the decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee in Lazenby v. Uni-
versal Underwriters Insurance Company,159 the tenets of McNulty have come
under a threefold attack from judges and writers. 160 First, there has been
substantial doubt expressed as to whether closing the insurance market on
the payment of punitive damages would actually deter reckless and wanton
conduct on our highways. Second, some writers have noted that, because of
the difficulty in discerning between ordinary negligence and gross negli-
gence, which would give rise to punitive damages, if coverage of punitive
damages were disallowed the extent of actual coverage in a given case could
vary considerably dependent on the caprice of the jury. Third, it has been
argued that denial of coverage of punitive damages violates the letter as
well as the spirit of state automobile financial responsibility laws.
Judge Murrah, for the Tenth Circuit, in American Surety Co. v. Gold,'6'
persuasively met all three of these arguments. As to the first argument,
Judge Murrah said:
We do not believe the Kansas courts would be persuaded by the ar-
guments pressed in Lazenby that closing the insurance market on the
payment of punitive damages would not tend to deter the reckless and
wanton driver. This argument seems to miss the mark, for we may as
well say criminal sanctions serve no useful purpose just because they
are constantly violated. The question is not so much the efficacy of
the policy underlying punitive damages; rather it is a question of the
implementation of that policy. Permitting the penalty for the misdeed
to be levied on one other than he who committed it cannot possibly
implement the policy.' 6 2
And as to the second:
Nor do we think the Kansas court would be persuaded by the argu-
ment that if public policy precludes contracts insuring against punitive
damage awards, the extent of coverage will vary with the whim of thejury as it undertakes to discern whether a given set of facts consti-
tutes ordinary or gross negligence. This argument has much to com-
mend it, for the fallibility of man makes some jury error inevitable.
We must assume, however, any given jury will accurately follow the
law and correctly distinguish liability for ordinary from liability for
1S Id. at 440.
159 214 Tenn. 639, 383 S.W.2d 1 (1964); see note 129 supra, and accompanying
text.160 See Brin, supra note 42; Note, supra note 47; 12 BUFF. L. REv. 623 (1963).
161 375 F.2d 523 (10th Cir. 1966).
162 Id. at 526-27.
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gross and wanton negligence. To hold to the contrary would impugn
the integrity of the jury system. 163
As to the third argument Judge Murrah simply said that the fundamental
purpose of financial responsibility laws is to provide compensation for in-
nocent victims of automobile accidents; once the victim has been made
whole by compensatory damages, denial of insurance coverage of punitive
damages would violate neither the spirit nor the letter of such laws.164
Judge Wisdom in McNulty also pointed to several practical problems re-
lated to allowing insurance against punitive damages. First, conflict of in-
terest problems could arise in conjunction with the insurer's defense of the
case against its insured. Second, there would be a conflict between the rule
allowing admission of evidence at trial of the financial worth of the de-
fendant in assessing the punitive damage issue and the rule disallowing
any reference to the jury of the defendant's insurance company. Third,
bizarre results would result in those instances where actual damages were
small but the defendant's conduct was particularly reprehensible and the
corresponding assessment of punitive damages representing the jury's retri-
bution was enormous.
On the other hand equally serious practical problems are engendered by
the disallowance of insurance against punitive damages. It is submitted that
probably more significant conflict of interest problems would thereby be
created. In fact, in all cases in which punitive damages are likely to be at
issue the insured would be well advised to obtain separate counsel on that
portion of the action involving punitive damages. The same would be true
in pre-trial settlement negotiations on the question of how much of the set-
tlement should be attributed to compensatory damages and how much to
punitive damages. 165 And serious questions are presented by denial of in-
demnity against punitive damages in those jurisdictions following the theory
of Texas' Stowers Doctrine. 166 Under the Stowers Doctrine, the insurer must
exercise in settlement negotiations the degree of care and diligence of an
ordinary prudent person in the management of his own business or be liable
for the full amount of a subsequent verdict, including that amount in excess
of policy limits. Typically, settlement negotiations are made in terms of
lump sums, no distinction being made between compensatory and punitive
damages. But in Texas and other jurisdictions the distinction is made in
the final judgment. Is the insurance company under the dictates of the Stow-
ers Doctrine if the judgment for compensatory damages is less than the set-
tlement offer but, coupled with the judgment for punitive damages, the total
amount exceeds the settlement offer?
But in the final analysis the simple thrust of Judge Wisdom's reasoning
still stands. If the basic purposes of punitive damages are punishment and
deterrence, then insurance against punitive damages frustrates those pur-
163 Id. at 527.
164 Id. at 527-28.
165 See Gonsoulin, supra note 25, at 443.
166 See G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1929), holding approved.
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poses, and therefore, is violative of public policy. In many jurisdictions,
including Texas, punitive damages work at cross-purposes, the other purposes
being: (1) to compensate the plaintiff for intangible injuries which are
otherwise too speculative to be proved with sufficient certainty; and (2)
to provide the plaintiff with a monetary inducement or "bounty" so that he
may exact society's pound of flesh from the defendant for outrageous be-
havior in those instances in which society is unable to do so. In those juris-
dictions which utilize punitive damages for these additional purposes, in-
demnity against punitive damages is not inconsistent with public policy. By
the same token, of course, public policy would not be violated by a re-
fusal to grant insurance against punitive damages on the basis that the par-
ties have not contracted therefor.
Judge Wisdom certainly recognized that many jurisdictions attribute a
compensatory function, carried over from early common law, to punitive
damages. He probably excepted such jurisdictions from much of the scope
of his reasoning by first going to great lengths to substantiate that under
Florida law punitive damages are purely for purposes of punishment and
deterrence and are not in the least compensatory, and second by the follow-
ing statement:
There is an argument for regarding the punitory theory of punitive
damages as anachronistic in cases where, historically exemplary dam-
ages represent non-pecuniary losses such as injured feelings, damaged
reputation, humiliation, shame, pain and suffering (in certain states).
In these cases it can be said that liability insurance is for the injured
party, and that the insurance carrier should be liable for such
losses.' 6 7
Under Texas law punitive damages do perform a recognized compensatory
function of making whole the plaintiff, in those cases in which a punitive
award is warranted, for actual non-pecuniary losses which are otherwise too
speculative and uncertain to be recovered. Interestingly, there is an appar-
ent anomaly in this state presented by the case law. There is ample author-
ity to the effect that Texas follows the more orthodox viewpoint with respect
to punitive damages.
In Piper v. Duncan the court said: "Exemplary damages are not al-
lowed as a matter of right or as compensation, but as an incident to and an
enhancement of the actual damages, as punishment for the wanton malicious
or oppressive conduct, of which complaint is made.' 168 And the Supreme
Court of Texas affirmed this statement in Bennett v. Howard by specific refer-
ence and by saying: "Exemplary damages are not allowed as a matter of
right, or as compensation. If such damages are allowed, they are consid-
ered excess compensation in addition to the actual damages sustained, as
punishment for the gross negligence alleged as the basis of the suit."'16 9 In
167 Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1962).
168 131 S.W.2d 397, 398 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1939), error ref.
169 141 Tex. 101, 109, 170 S.W.2d 709, 713 (1943).
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fact, those cases in support of the orthodox theory of punitive damages in
Texas are almost endless. 170
On the other hand, all punitive damages are to some extent compensatory
because they are universally awarded to the injured party himself. 171 But
Texas courts go much further. Notwithstanding a long line of judicial pro-
nouncement, to the contrary, Texas courts continue to regard punitive dam-
ages as compensatory payment to an injured party for mental suffering and
for other actual damages too remote to be otherwise recompensed. For ex-
ample, in Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank v. Britton the court noted:
The award of exemplary damages sometimes serves a twofold pur-
pose; first, as punishment to the defendant so as to compel respect by
him for the law and to deter others from similar infractions; and sec-
ond, it is sometimes said that they are allowed as compensation to the
plaintiff for elements of damage that are otherwise too remote to be
considered in estimating the actual damages, such as expenses incurred,
mental anguish, and injury to the reputation or business and the
like.172
Justice Bonner's opinion for the Supreme Court of Texas in Flanagan v.
Womack 173 is interesting and goes far to explain the origin of the anomaly of
treatment of punitive damages in this state.
170 "Exemplary damages are authorized in proper cases as punishment for a wrong-
doer and they cannot properly be awarded as additional compensatory damages." Shef-
field Div. Armco Steel Corp. v. Jones, 369 S.W.2d 71, 82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1963).
"Exemplary damages are awarded as a matter of sound public policy in punishment
of the guilty one for malicious acts, and not as compensation. The amount awarded
goes to the complaining party merely because assessed in his suit." Evans v. McKay,
212 S.W. 680, 685 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919), error dismissed without judgment.
"Exemplary damages for gross negligence are awarded by way of civil punishment of
-as distinguished from compensation by-a party who does harm with a callous
state of mind." Bernal v. Seitt, 158 Tex. 521, 527, 313 S.W.2d 520, 523 (1958).
"Exemplary damages are not allowed as compensation, but as punishment, or 'smart
money,' for an offense committed, and necessarily involves a blending of the general
interest of society with those peculiar to the aggrieved party." South Texas Coaches
v. Eastland, 101 S.W.2d 878, 883 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1937), error dismissed.
See also Southern Cotton Press & Mfg. Co. v. Bradley, 52 Tex. 587 (1880); Hays
v. Houston G.N.R.R., 46 Tex. 272 (1876); Cotton v. Cooper, 209 S.W. 135 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1919), judgment adopted; Jamison v. Sockwell, 405 S.W.2d 618 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1966), error ref. n.r.e.; General Ins. Corp. v. Harris, 327 S.W.2d
651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1959); Burlington-Rock Island R.R. v. Newsom, 239
S.W.2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1951); Schutz v. Morris, 201 S.W.2d 144 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1947); Southwestern Gas & Elec. Co. v. Stanley, 45 S.W.2d 671
(Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1931); Anderson v. Alcus, 42 S.W.2d 294 (Tex. Civ. App.
-Beaumont 1931); Morton Salt Co. v. Wells, 35 S.W.2d 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1930); Express Publishing Co. v. Hormuth, 5 S.W.2d 1025 (Tex. Civ. App.-E1 Paso
1928), error ref.; Steinberg v. Morgan, 300 S.W. 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1927); Evans v. McKay, 212 S.W. 680 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1919), error dismissed
without judgment; Holland v. Closs, 146 S.W. 671 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1912);
Harmon v. Callahan, 35 S.W. 705 (Tex. Civ. App. 1896).
171 See Koehler v. Sircovich, 269 S.W. 812, 819 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1925):
"It has always seemed to the writer to be illogical and impolitic to permit a plaintiff in
actions of this character to recover exemplary damages. When such damages are
assessed, it should be for the benefit of a public charity or other public purposes, and
not to give extra compensation for private injury."
172 114 S.W.2d 907, 911 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1938), rev'd on other grounds,
134 Tex. 529, 135 S.W.2d 981 (1940).
173 54 Tex. 45 (1880).
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The doctrine of exemplary damages doubtless originated from those
cases in which a sense of justice to the injured party demanded that
more compensation should be given him than could be allowed by any
defined strict legal rule for the measure of damages. Frequently the
mere physical injury sustained, and which ordinarily is the test of ac-
tual damages, would of itself be comparatively insufficient, but the
outrage upon the feelings-the ordinary test of what is now usually
called exemplary, vindictive or punitory damages-would be of such
gross character or under such indignant circumstances as should re-
quire ample reparation from the offender, but which could not be re-
ferred to any fixed primary standard. Hence this character of damage
was, in a great degree, necessarily left to the discretion of the jury trying
the particular case. Indulgence was extended by the courts to such
verdicts, as they tended to prevent breaches of the peace, and to en-
courage, by a resort to the law of the land, the settlement of difficul-
ties which otherwise might have ended in personal conflicts. To this
extent the public also was interested.
This indirect result to the public good, led some courts into the error
of assuming as one of the grounds why such damages should be al-
lowed at the suit of a private party, that it was intended as a public
punishment to the offender, thus making that an active cause which
originally was but a passive result, and in this way converting private
recompense into public punishment.
I do not doubt the propriety of allowing full compensation to the
injured party for both that damage which can be reduced to a rea-
sonably fixed money standard, usually called actual damages, and
also for that damage which should be recovered, but which cannot,
in the nature of things, be determined by any such standard, but
which must be left to the sound discretion of the juries and courts of
the country, and which are properly included under what is now called
exemplary damages. 174
In short, notwithstanding clear judicial statements to the contrary, there
is an equally long line of authority in Texas to the effect that punitive dam-
ages are compensatory as well as punitory.17 5  Accordingly, Texas is ex-
empted from much of the force of Judge Wisdom's public policy arguments
in McNulty. Indemnity against punitive damages would not totally frustrate
the purposes of such damages in Texas. The compensatory function would
still stand.
Finally, argument can be made that denial of insurance against punitive
damages would frustrate an additional fundamental purpose of such dam-
ages. Under the "bounty" or "private attorney general" theory punitive
damages encourage private individuals to bring action against defendants,
guilty of outrageous conduct offensive to society, in instances in which no
criminal offense is committed or where the state is too preoccupied with
more important matters to bring action. In view of the extremely crowded
174 Id. at 47-48.
175 Traweek v. Martin-Brown Co., 79 Tex. 460, 14 S.W. 564 (1890); Bisso v.
Southworth, 71 Tex. 765, 10 S.W. 523 (1888); Stuart v. Western Union Tel. Co., 66
Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351 (1885); Cole v. Tucker, 6 Tex. 266 (1851); Briggs v. Rodriguez,
236 S.W.2d 510 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951), error ref. n.r.e.; Wright Titus,
Inc. v. Swafford, 133 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1939), error dismissed, judg-
ment correct; Foster v. Bourgeois, 253 S.W. 880 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1923); Bas-
sham v. Evans, 216 S.W. 446 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919).
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dockets of today's criminal courts and the overburdened offices of public
prosecutors, the "bounty" function is important. A tortfeasor covered for
punitive as well as compensatory damages by a liability insurance policy is,
generally speaking, a manifestly more attractive defendant to an aggrieved
plaintiff than one not similarly covered.
III. CONCLUSION
There is little doubt that exemplary damages will continue to be utilized
by many jurisdictions in this country for purposes of complementing the
traditional punitory functions of such damages by providing additional com-
pensation to plaintiffs as well as additional incentive for plaintiffs to bring
legal action. To the extent that these damages are so used, public policy
is not a viable issue with respect to the ultimate question of the legality of
indemnity against liability for exemplary damages. Resolution of the mat-
ter, at least in Texas, must logically rest with a construction of the coverage
provisions of the insurance contract. And, unless the Texas courts wish to
adopt expressly a position of honoring the reasonable expectations of the
insured, the conclusion is unavoidable that the coverage provisions of the
Texas Standard Automobile Liability Insurance Policy do not provide for cov-
erage of exemplary damages.
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